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INTRODUCTION 
Rational choice theory has achieved widespread influence in a 
number of social science disciplines, most notably economics and politi-
cal science. Given its prominent position within economics, it is not sur-
prising that rational choice theory (and other rationalist perspectives) 
dominates theory and research on the corporation and decision-making 
by corporate actors. By contrast, however, the theory has failed to gain 
more than a toehold in sociology. Indeed, most sociologists are down-
right hostile to rational choice theory. When pressed to explain why, 
those in the discipline are very likely to complain that the perspective is 
“asociological”; that the theory posits an atomized conception of the in-
dividual that does not accord with the “sociological perspective.” But 
when it comes to human sociability, what exactly is the “sociological 
perspective?” Beyond the rather facile assertion that humans are pro-
foundly “social creatures,” sociologists have done little to fashion a dis-
tinctive account of what that actually means. After all, lots of species are 
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intensely social, perhaps none more so than ants.1 Surely we are not so-
cial in the same sense that ants are. Our closest evolutionary relatives—
gorillas and chimpanzees—are also very social species, and social in 
many ways that mirror human sociability. But there are also myriad ways 
in which human social life is qualitatively different from that of even our 
closest evolutionary cousins. Bottom line: to dismiss rational choice the-
ory for its failure to honor the extent to which we are “social creatures” is 
to evade the real question: what is the distinctive essence of human so-
ciability? 
I will not pretend to offer anything like a complete answer to that 
question here, but believing that social life—including economic behav-
ior and corporation decision making—is shaped by far more than rational 
calculus and narrow material motives, I want to use my contribution to 
the volume to call your attention to an evolutionary puzzle that has fasci-
nated and perplexed me for at least 30 years and which, I’m convinced, 
renders narrow economistic theories of human behavior untenable. So 
while I certainly will not deliver on anything remotely resembling an 
alternative to narrow “economic man,” I hope my sensitizing remarks 
will at least begin to suggest the kind of “micro-foundation” we would 
need to fashion to fully grasp the complexities of human behavior, in-
cluding those that govern the economic realm and corporate life in par-
ticular. 
I. ON THE RISE OF MODERN HUMANS AND THE PUZZLING ORIGINS OF 
THE EXISTENTIAL FUNCTION OF THE SOCIAL 
The consensus is that modern humans—homo sapiens sapiens—
emerged at the very southern tip of Africa around 200,000 years ago. As 
far as we can tell from the archaeological record, these new arrivals were 
anatomically indistinguishable from us. And yet behaviorally, they were 
very different, at least initially. In fact, we will need to fast forward 
roughly 150,000 years before we encounter clear evidence of what we 
would recognize as truly human behavior. The evidence for this behavior 
is overwhelming, appearing as a veritable explosion in the archaeological 
record of elaborate ritual burial and routine production of art and orna-
mentation—among other indicators—that we are clearly in the presence 
of our existential, as opposed to materialist, kin. 
What is the nature of this “explosion” and what are its implications 
for an understanding of the social, as regards modern humans? One pop-
ular understanding of this evolutionary moment is that it marks the 
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emergence of “culture” in the human experience. But even if we adopt a 
fairly narrow definition of culture, this account is demonstrably false. 
Tools, after all, are a rudimentary element of culture and certainly all of 
the prior species in the Homo line have been shown to produce and use 
tools. Indeed, depending on how broadly one defines the term, there is 
evidence for tool usage among our closet contemporary nonhuman rela-
tives. For example, West African chimpanzees have been shown to use 
stone hammers and anvils to crack nuts.2 Other species of chimpanzees 
have deployed other tools—including termite “fishing poles,” pestles, 
and various levers—in foraging for food.3 But even if we elect to set the 
bar a bit higher in our requirements for culture, it would be impossible to 
deny, say, Neanderthal that level of evolutionary development. Beyond 
an effective and highly adaptable—if static—tool assemblage, there are 
at least scattered claims made for rudimentary examples of representa-
tional art at Neanderthal sites. These include an incised piece of bone 
from a 350,000-year-old site at Bilzingsleben in Germany and an alleged 
outline of a female engraved on a pebble from the 230,000-year-old pre-
Mousterian site of Berekat Ram in Israel.4 
If the “explosion” of 45,000–50,000 years ago does not represent 
the onset of culture in the human—or even hominid—experience, how 
are we to understand the breathtaking leap that seems to have taken 
place? While others have stressed the emergence of symbolic thinking or 
high culture, as a sociologist, I would underscore the collective dimen-
sions of the breakthrough. The sudden proliferation of art, elaborate ritu-
al burial, and distinctive local tool assemblages, speaks to an unprece-
dented capacity for coordinated symbolic activity and collaborative 
meaning making. Henceforth, I will refer to this, in shorthand, as the on-
set of the existential function of the social. 
While hominids had heretofore banded together almost entirely for 
the survival benefits afforded by group life, the collective now served a 
second separable function: the provision of group members with a dis-
tinctive collective identity, a shared cosmology, and elaborated rituals 
that together affirmed and valorized the life of the group. This represents 
a qualitative break with the entire 1.5 million-year sweep of the hominid 
experience on earth. We are finally in the presence of a form of sociabil-
ity that we can clearly recognize as akin to our own. 
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I cannot overstress the significance of the coordinated, collabora-
tive, and intersubjective nature of the activities reflected in the archaeo-
logical record from this period and beyond. A single example will suffice 
to make the point. It comes from an extraordinary burial at the 28,000-
year-old site of Sungir in Russia. Archaeologist Ian Tattersall describes 
what the excavation of the site revealed: 
[T]wo young individuals and a sixty-year-old male (no previous 
kind of human had ever survived to such an age) were interred with 
an astonishing material richness. Each of the deceased was dressed 
in clothing onto which more than three thousand ivory beads had 
been sewn; and experiments have shown that each bead had taken 
an hour to make. They also wore carved pendants, bracelets, and 
shell necklaces. The juveniles, buried head to head, were flanked by 
two mammoth tusks over two yards long. What’s more, these tusks 
had been straightened, something that . . . could only have been 
achieved by boiling them. But how? The imagination boggles, for 
this was clearly not a matter of dropping hot stones into a small 
skin-lined pit.5 
Tattersall goes on to speculate about what the burial tells us about 
the people who carried it out, arguing for such things as a belief in an 
afterlife, the presence of material surplus, and a surprisingly rich and 
elaborated material culture.6 But, as a sociologist, I am struck as much by 
what Tattersall doesn’t mention as what he does. Above all else the site 
speaks to an extraordinary capacity for collaborative, meaningful, sym-
bolic activity. I use the term “meaningful” to underscore the fact that the 
ritual act encoded in the interment was clearly full of cognitive and affec-
tive significance for those involved. How many people did it take to boil 
and straighten the mammoth tusks? Who contributed the 3,000 person-
hours required to make and then sew the ivory beads on to the burial 
garments? What did the various grave goods and the rituals involved in 
their production mean to the mourners? We will never know, but we can 
be assured that the members of the group shared an acute and elaborate 
sense of the event’s significance. In sharp contrast to the pre-explosion 
Homo sapiens, whose archaeological traces remain strangely mute, we 
are finally in the presence of voracious symbolists, people like us who 
possess both the capacity for, and an apparent need to fashion, shared 
identities and cosmologies as a central component of social life. 
Before I move on and discuss the implications of the newly emer-
gent existential function of the social, I cannot resist taking up the puz-
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zling temporal gap between the rise of anatomically modern humans 
200,000 years ago and the social behavioral revolution of 45,000–50,000 
years ago. How are we to account for this extended gap? I see three pos-
sible answers to the question. The first possible answer is that the earliest 
“moderns” were, in fact, engaged in symbolic, collaborative activity, but 
we have yet to find the corroborating physical evidence to support the 
claim. Given the European bias in the archaeological record, this view is 
at least possible. Virtually all of our evidence for the qualitative change 
in human behavior comes from sites on the continent. By contrast, ana-
tomically modern humans have been in Africa for all of the species 
200,000 years on earth, and in the Middle East for some 160,000 years. 
Perhaps we have not searched long and hard enough in these areas to 
produce the evidence of much earlier instances of ritual burial and art. 
While theoretically possible, this first answer strains credibility.  
After all, while Europe has certainly seen intensive archaeological activi-
ty, so too has Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, Europe’s fascination 
with Egypt and the Holy Lands made North Africa and the Middle East a 
central focus of archaeological research from early on. And since Lea-
key’s sensational finds in Kenya’s Great Rift Valley in the early 1950s,7 
East Africa has been the center of archaeological investigation on human 
origins. Given the research attention lavished on these areas, it seems 
highly unlikely that we have simply missed the evidence of the “explo-
sion,” especially given how extensive the evidence has been at the later 
sites. In short, the paucity of evidence of collaborative meaning making 
in Africa is almost certainly real, reflecting its general absence in the 
lives of the earlier Homo sapiens. 
Given the lack of anatomical changes pre- and post-explosion, lan-
guage, or the lack thereof, may hold the key to the puzzle. The second 
possible answer goes like this: while anatomically adapted to speech, 
perhaps early humans lacked the precise neural circuitry needed for fully 
elaborated language. So deprived, earlier Homo sapiens may still have 
possessed a marginally greater capacity for interspecies communication 
than Neanderthal, but nothing compared to what they would develop in 
time. While not identical, this view bears a strong family resemblance to 
the account of anthropologist Richard Klein, who has long held that the 
symbolic revolution of 50,000 years ago must have been triggered by a 
random genetic mutation that improved the organization of the brain, 
affording humans the capacity for language and enhanced symbolic ac-
tivity.8 
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The third possible answer is really a variant of the second. While 
fully adapted to speech and language, it may be that the actual behavioral 
innovation lagged behind the emergence of anatomically modern Homo 
sapiens. This may not be quite as crazy as it sounds. Think of written 
language. Clearly humans had both the physiological and mental capaci-
ty for written language long before those capacities were enacted behav-
iorally. Is it really so far-fetched to imagine that something similar might 
have happened with speech and the development of fully elaborated lan-
guage? 
Whichever version of the last two answers one favors, both accord 
well with the physical evidence and help explain some otherwise puz-
zling features of the archaeological record. The absence of significant 
ritual activity prior to 50,000 years ago becomes much less puzzling if 
we assume that a fully realized capacity for human speech and commu-
nication did not accompany the rise of anatomically modern humans but 
only developed later. This might also explain a second intriguing anoma-
ly in the archaeological record. While Neanderthals disappear from 
Western Europe a scant 12,000 years after modern humans arrive on the 
scene, the two species appear to have co-existed in the Middle East for 
nearly 60,000 years, from 100,000 to 40,000 years ago. How can we ac-
count for these very different fates? Quite easily if we imagine that only 
the European Homo sapiens possessed a fully realized capacity for hu-
man speech and language. Without such a capacity, perhaps their Middle 
Eastern predecessors lacked the key evolutionary advantage needed to 
displace their Neanderthal rivals. 
Whatever the case, the extraordinary evolutionary advantages con-
ferred on modern humans by the acquisition of language and the related 
capacity for collaborative symbolic activity are powerfully affirmed by 
the archaeological record pre- and post-explosion. Consider the follow-
ing stark contrast. Over roughly the first 150,000 years of Homo sapiens 
presence on this planet, the species was pretty much confined to Africa 
and the Middle East. The physical traces of their presence suggest a gen-
erally undifferentiated, continuous way of life. Nor do their numbers ap-
pear to increase all that much during their long tenure in Africa. And as 
noted above, where they overlap with earlier human ancestors—for ex-
ample, Neanderthal—they coexist with, rather than displace, them. 
After the “great leap” of 50,000 years ago, the story could not be 
more different. Within at most 35,000 years—and considerably less if we 
can believe recent dates from certain sites in South America—modern 
humans succeeded in peopling the globe. Within a scant 12,000 years of 
arriving in Europe, they—make that “we”—displaced the venerable Ne-
anderthal who had lived continuously in the region for at least 350,000 
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years. Moreover, our numbers expanded in fits and starts before mush-
rooming explosively over the past four centuries. Finally, the “generally 
undifferentiated continuous” way of life of our pre-explosion ancestors 
quickly gave way to the dizzying variety of cultures and life worlds re-
flected in the archaeological record extending back 30,000-40,000 years. 
Over this span, “humanity was transformed from a relatively rare and 
insignificant large mammal to something like a geologic force.”9 None of 
this is really all that surprising when you consider the extraordinary evo-
lutionary advantages which accompanied the acquisition of language and 
the greatly expanded capacity for communication, social coordination 
and forward planning that followed from this endowment. 
II. THE COLLECTIVE AS EXISTENTIAL REFUGE 
For all the obvious benefits that flowed from the hypothesized lan-
guage/consciousness “package,” however, our evolutionary inheritance 
would seem to have come at a cost. In liberating us from a primarily ma-
terial existence, language/consciousness endowed humans with art, sym-
bolic thought, and expanded reason but also new fears and threatening 
forms of awareness. These were two sides of the same evolutionary coin. 
I see existential fear and uncertainty as an unintended evolutionary by-
product of whatever mix of genetic and/or anatomical changes triggered 
the social behavioral explosion of 50,000 years ago. By “existential fear 
and uncertainty” I simply mean the clichéd “meaning of life” questions 
that, among all species, past and present, only modern humans seem ca-
pable of asking. Only the most stubbornly non-reflective person can, 
from time to time, avoid the nagging, if generally inchoate, sense that his 
or her life is accidental, without inherent purpose, devoid of meaning, 
and destined to end in death. The philosopher Thomas Nagel terms these 
fears the “outer perspective,” that state of detached reflection on what 
would appear at times to be the depressingly obvious “truths” about the 
human condition.10  According to Nagel, the capacity to stand outside 
ourselves and reflect on our situation is the basis for the “outer perspec-
tive” and the threatening mix of vertigo and fear that accompanies it. 
Where exactly does this capacity come from? It is impossible to say 
for sure. Perhaps it is simply our greater capacity for abstract thought 
that allows us to formulate these questions. I am more inclined, however, 
to stress the strong link between language and these new fears. Language 
grants us the linguistic tools to make of ourselves an object. Instead of 
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being the “I,” the unconscious subject, the spontaneous actor, we can 
now step outside of ourselves and become “me,” the object of my own 
reflection.11 This is heady stuff and, if we can trust Mead and a host of 
others, the key to all those social skills that rest on our ability to “take the 
role of the other.” But for all the extraordinary social advantages that 
come with this ability, it may well also be the source of our existential 
fears. 
Our existential fears are thus rooted in the intimations of aloneness 
and meaninglessness made possible by our evolutionary capacity for ex-
panded self-consciousness. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that our at-
tempts to escape from these fears typically involve efforts to overcome 
or lose self-consciousness. Nietzsche, for instance, described the Chris-
tian desire for “redemption” as “the essence of all Christian needs . . . it 
is the most persuaded, most painful of affirmations of it in sublime sym-
bols and practices. The Christian wants to get rid of himself.”12 Similar-
ly, the timeless appeal of a love relationship would seem to rest on the 
desire to lose oneself in another. In general, the effectiveness of any col-
laborative existential project rests on its ability to inhibit self-
consciousness by embedding the individual in a system of socially con-
structed meanings that substitutes the reassuring subjectivity of the “in-
ner view” for the alienating effects of the “outer perspective.” It is the 
meaningful worlds we fashion in concert with others that insulate us 
from the threat of the “outer perspective” and affirm and valorize our 
lives. 
This is precisely what I have in mind when I refer to the “existential 
function of the social.” For most of us, most of the time, the latent threat 
of the outer perspective is held in check by the lived experience of being 
immersed in the shared logics, meanings, and normative structures of the 
primary groups and relationships that undergird our lives. As a result, our 
daily lives are typically grounded in the unshakeable conviction that no 
one’s life is more important than our own and that the world is an inher-
ently meaningful place. But one does not will this inner view into exist-
ence of his, or her, own accord. It is instead a collaborative product, born 
of the everyday reciprocal meaning making, identify conferring efforts 
we engage in with those who share the micro and meso worlds we inhab-
it. In this we function as existential co-conspirators, relentlessly—if gen-
erally unconsciously—exchanging affirmations that sustain our sense of 
our own significance and our lives inherent meaningfulness. 
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The elaborate burials that suddenly appear in the archaeological 
record following the “explosion” of 50,000 years ago are the quintes-
sence of this kind of collaborative existential project. Consider again the 
interment at Sungir.13 Tattersall describes sites like Sungir as “the most 
ancient incontrovertible evidence for the existence of religious experi-
ence.”14 What are religions after all but elaborated cosmologies and belief 
systems that offer reassuring answers to all those threatening questions. 
Am I alone? No, I am part of a special community of the faithful, a “cho-
sen people,” if you will. Is life devoid of meaning? No, through our 
shared faith we have privileged access to knowledge that renders the 
world a profoundly meaningful place. What of death? Do we cease to 
exist when we die? No, provided the community offers the appropriate 
ritual response, the deceased is assured life after death. If death repre-
sents the most threatening embodiment of the “outer perspective,” then a 
shared belief in an afterlife and collaborative practices designed to ensure 
its attainment represents a powerful collective refutation of the threat. 
The elaborate and extraordinarily labor-intensive behaviors reflected in 
the Sungir burial speak eloquently to the emergence of the existential in 
the human experience. There is simply no narrow instrumental survival 
function served by such rituals. The thousands of hours devoted to 
straightening tusks and making and sewing beads could, after all, have 
gone into hunting, food preparation, shelter construction, or countless 
other activities directly linked to group survival. And why bury valuable 
goods and foodstuffs with the deceased when they could be used or con-
sumed by the living? They did so because the binding, existential beliefs 
of the collective required it. 
Let me be clear. I am not for a minute suggesting that all of the new 
behaviors that followed from the explosion of 50,000 years ago speak to 
the existential motivations touched on here. Endowed with language and 
expanded consciousness, modern humans behaved the way they did be-
cause they could not do otherwise. That is, they were now adapted to 
meaning making, communication, symbolic activity, and so on. This is 
simply what modern humans do. They also engaged in these new activi-
ties because they were instrumentally very effective. As noted above, 
there were great material advantages to be gained from their newfound 
capacity to communicate with each other and plan and carry out increas-
ingly complex collaborative activities. Hunting and foraging expeditions 
could now range over much broader areas and involve more people. Pro-
ductive roles within the group could (and judging from archaeological 
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evidence, did) become more specialized, yielding survival gains for the 
collective. I could add other examples, but the point should be clear. 
Many of the new behaviors should be seen as trial and error efforts to 
devise more effective solutions to practical problems confronting the 
group. While Neanderthals survived by adapting the same general tool 
kit to a broad range of environments and climactic conditions, post-
explosion humans—by virtue of their new evolutionary endowments—
became (and remain) relentless innovators. 
III. ECHOES OF SUNGIR TODAY AND SOME FINAL THOUGHTS 
Before closing with some thoughts on the relationship between the 
material and existential functions of the social, it is important to assert 
the fundamental similarity between us and the Sungir band responsible 
for the aforementioned burial. It simply won’t do to dismiss the behav-
iors reflected in the burial as those of a “primitive” people whose limited 
understanding of the world obliged them to engage in forms of irrational, 
non-instrumental behavior. The need to fashion shared identities and 
meanings to restrain existential fear and valorize our existence remains 
central to our lives. And safeguarding the central sources of meaning and 
identity in our lives continues to serve as powerful motivators of our ac-
tions, even when those actions fly in the face of, or seem to contradict, 
instrumental rationality. Don’t believe me? Let me offer just a handful of 
(more or less) contemporary examples that in their own way seem just as 
irrational and contrary to material interests as those of the Sungir funeral 
party. 
In the classic work of social psychology, When Prophecy Fails, Le-
on Festinger and several co-authors tell the story of a UFO or flying sau-
cer cult in Chicago, whose leader prophesized the destruction of the 
world.15 However, because of their abiding faith and uprightness, the 
group, known as the Seekers, was to be spared and transported by flying 
saucer to the planet Clarion at an appointed date and time. To prepare for 
their exodus, group members quit jobs, left spouses and gave away their 
possessions and money. So what happened when the flying saucer failed 
to appear? Did group members turn on the cult leader whose false proph-
ecy had cost them so dearly? Hardly, having organized their worldview 
and identities around the group, its members were ill prepared to aban-
don this existential structure of their lives. Happily, they didn’t have to. 
Soon after the abortive exit, the leader of the Seekers received another 
prophetic “transmission” from Clarion in which the aliens announced 
they had spared Earth because of the group’s abiding faith. Their beliefs 
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and identities thus valorized, virtually all group members recommitted to 
the collective and its all-important faith-based mission. 
A more consequential and enduring example of the material costs 
of existential commitments would be the fierce defense of Jim Crow and 
the “southern way of life” assayed by many whites in the region. This 
included not only poor white agricultural laborers who were as disadvan-
taged economically by the system as their black counterparts, but also 
members of the South’s white business elite who paid dearly as the 
anachronistic caste restrictions imposed by Jim Crow retarded economic 
development—and profits—in the region.16 
Then there is the fascinating case, documented by Kate Kellogg, of 
willful resistance by surgical residents to reforms that on their face 
would seem to be very much in their collective material interest.17 In 
2003, in the face of growing concern about errors and accidents commit-
ted by exhausted, sleep-deprived surgical trainees, the American Council 
of Graduate Medical Education mandated a reduction in resident work 
hours to 80 per week. Over the course of two-plus years spent observing 
the attempted implementation of the reforms, Kellogg documented fierce 
resistance to the new rules. Indeed, during the period of her study, the 
reforms were successfully resisted in two of the three hospitals she stud-
ied. How can we understand this seemingly irrational, non-instrumental 
response on the part of highly educated medical professionals? Though 
she certainly doesn’t use the language I’ve employed here, Kellogg’s 
answer to the question is fully consistent with my stress on the “existen-
tial function of the social.” Many doctors resisted because they were 
deeply invested in what she calls the traditional “Iron Man” identity and 
culture of residency training. Notwithstanding the objective benefits rep-
resented by the reforms, many doctors were loath to abandon the existen-
tial commitments encoded in the Iron Man identity, beliefs, and over-
arching way of life. 
Finally, just for “fun,” what rationalist perspective on social life 
could ever help us understand Islamic suicide bombers, or the roughly 
100 Buddhist monks in Tibet who have burned themselves to death over 
the past few years to protest China’s “occupation” of the territory? Once 
again, these are cases that can only be understood by reference to the 
collaborative construction of shared beliefs, identities and overarching 
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world views, or ideologies, that render these seemingly unthinkable ac-
tions, not only possible, but reasonably common. 
In offering up these examples, I am certainly not suggesting that ra-
tional calculus, self-interest, and the material demands of life are some-
how secondary to the existential function of the social. On the contrary, 
the materialist challenge of human existence was no less salient after the 
great leap forward 50,000 years ago than it had been before. It is just that 
a second, very different, social function/activity was now evident in the 
archaeological record as well. It would be a mistake, however, to see the 
material and existential functions of the social as separate from each oth-
er or to attribute preeminence to one or the other. Marx famously charac-
terized religion as “the opiate of the masses,” insisting that religious be-
liefs and ideologies (read: the byproducts of existential meaning making) 
were dependent upon and indeed subordinate to the underlying material 
logic of society.18 I find this rank ordering of these two realms or social 
functions unconvincing and overly simplistic. The human capacity and 
need for meaning and identity is as powerful a structuring force in social 
life as the material demands on the collective. It is precisely because 
modern humans need and are relentless in their efforts to fashion shared 
meanings (such as Christian theology) and identities (like Catholic, Lu-
theran) to restrain existential doubt that these elaborate constructions are 
available to those (such as capitalists) who would appropriate and exploit 
them for them own purposes. 
The point is, the material/instrumental and the existential are inex-
tricably linked. Even as strategic actors are working to advance their nar-
row material interests, they are simultaneously exercising the distinctive 
human capacity for meaning making and the construction of collective 
identities. We do what we do both to achieve instrumental advantage and 
to fashion existentially meaningful worlds for ourselves and others. This 
is as true today as it was when the Sungir band laid to rest their fallen 
brethren. Any complete theory of human strategic action must take this 
mix of instrumental and existential motives into account. This applies to 
economic behavior and corporate culture just as much as it does to any 
other aspect of social life. Until we take seriously the need to better inte-
grate a concern with the existential function of the social into our schol-
arship on economic life and corporate behavior, we can never hope to 
fully understand these critically important and powerful realms of social 
life. 
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